

# Terrorism Financing. The Socio-Economic and Political Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in Lake Chad Basin

Akepe Linus Enobi<sup>1</sup>, Samuel F. Johnson-Rokosu<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*School of Business and Public Policy, Saint Monica University, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, E-mail: [linus@iicfip.org](mailto:linus@iicfip.org)*

<sup>2</sup>*Department of Accounting, Faculty of Business Administration, University of Lagos, Nigeria, E-mail: [rokosu@live.com](mailto:rokosu@live.com) (Corresponding author)*

---

**Abstract** *Various Scholars account for the actual date of the evolution of Boko Haram terrorist group. However, the sect came to prominence in 2009 following the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf in police custody. Aside from the police act and Mohammed Yusuf's death, poverty, unemployment, lack of development, high level of illiterates, unkept electoral promises are identified as other reasons for the rise of Boko Haram insurgency. This study involves determination of socio-political and economic impact of Boko Haram insurgency on Lake Chad basin. To achieve this, mixed research method was employed in the study because both primary and secondary data are used. Many factors can be adduced as driving force that motivates Boko Haram activities in the region such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, under-development/education defiance region and neglects by government. Finding in the study shows that lack of government support for armed forces and low moral; lack of government political will to fight the insurgency; political interest all contribute in recent time to the rise of terrorist activities in Lake Chad. Finding revealed that the increase in Boko Haram activities in recent time in the region have negatively impact on the socio political/economic activities and these is due partly to increase in terrorist financing. The study suggests therefore that government ability in Lake Chad basin to cut the sources of terrorist finance will significantly affect Boko Haram activities and attacks.*

**Key words** Terrorism financing, Boko Haram, insurgency, Lake Chad Basin

**JEL Codes:** G32, G39

---

## 1. Introduction

The origin and history of Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad Basin has different versions. However, it is generally agreed by various scholars that Boko Haram terrorist group started in Borno State, Nigeria. It is equally true that the date of its evolution could not be agreed, some scholars have record indicating 1995, other 2002 and yet another 2000s, which ever date, the sect came to prominence in 2009 following the death of its leader, Mohammed Yusuf in police custody, in which the

police were perceived and labeled as an enemy organisation by the sect. This singular act of the police made the sect to attack Churches, Mosques, villages and markets places in Borno State and later Yobe State in North-East Nigeria before the spread to other part of Lake Chad Basin.

Boko Haram derive it name from combination of Hausa word boko meaning "Animist,western or otherwise non-Islamic education" and the Arabic word haram figuratively meaning "sin" literally, "forbidden" (Kelly *et al.*, 2015). This name was earned by the sect due to its Strong opposition to anything Western, which it sees as corrupting Muslims (Dennis, 2012). Aside from the police act and Mohammed Yusuf's death, poverty, unemployment, lack of development, high level of illiterates, unkept electoral promises are identified as other reasons for the rise of Boko Haram insurgency. From 2009-2015, there were constant attacks and expansion of capture territories in North-East Nigeria and other parts of Lake Chad Basin by the terrorists. Terrorists activities significantly worsened the socio-political and economic situation in the region. The monumental cost of combating terrorists war by Lake Chad basis nations is already taking its toll on the region economy, this makes it imperative for the governments to consider a wake-up call to widen the frontiers of the war against Boko Haram to include tracking and locking the sources of funding the insurgents. These cannot be achieved without the support of international anti-terrorism agencies, governments and regional support from European Union.

Studies on activities of Boko Haram terrorists group and their sources of finance and effect on socio-political situation in Lake Chad basis (with particular reference to Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad Republics) are scanty. Although there are studies on Boko Haram with reference only to Nigeria, this study tend to add to knowledge by expanding the scope to include Lake Chad Basin. Prior studies are not robust; nevertheless they raise a number of issues, one of which forms the basis of this study. The issues raised include: What are the socio-political and economic situation in Lake Chad basin as a result of Boko Haram terrorists group? How does Boko Haram compare to other terrorists group in other regions? This paper tends to determine socio-economic and political implications of Boko Haram terrorism financing in Lake Chad basin.

### 1.1. Research objectives

The study will attempt to achieve the following purposes

- i. To evaluate socio-economic and political situation in Lake Chad basin as a result of Boko Haram insurgency
- ii. To determine the relationship between Boko Haram activities and level of poverty and unemployment in Lake Chad basin.

## 1.2. Research approach

This study covers Boko Haram insurgence activities in Lake Chad Basin (that is, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria). The research approach entails literature review that is carried out to identify the knowledge gap in previous studies, to obtain background information to the research topic, to identify tested methods, techniques and research designs for uncovering the answer to the research questions, as well as to obtain an understanding of the conceptual principles that have a bearing on the study. Literature review involves library research which in turn includes reading previous research publications, journal articles and textbooks. The survey research technique and stratified sampling method will be used in this study. The method is specifically selected because of its (1) superior sampling procedure to the simple random sampling or systematic sampling procedure, and (2) the method ensure a fairly equal representation of the variables for the study. It uses extra methods of representativeness by first, identifying some characteristics that are being researched and then using these characteristics as a basis for further random sampling of the entire population (Asika, 2009). Questionnaires was administered to collect data relating to Boko Haram insurgency driving force in Lake Chad Basin. The questionnaire was subjected to a validity test. This literature review is complemented with the use of nonparametric and descriptive statistics techniques and is applied on primary data obtained.

## 1.3. Research hypotheses

*Hypothesis 1:* There is no positive association between Boko Haram insurgency and socio-economic/Political realities in Lake Chad Basin.

*Hypothesis 2:* Increase in Boko Haram activities has no significant relationship on poverty and unemployment in Lake Chad Basin.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1. Boko Haram attacks in Lake Chad Basin

Boko Haram insurgency has been focus mainly on Nigeria soil since its inception, but increases the tempo of its attacks since 2009 after the death of Mohammed Yusuf. The formation of joint military action in Lake Chad basin made those participating countries to be targeted by the terrorists for attack. Boko Haram has been attacking Cameroon also for nearly a year (2014) before the formation of the joint force. The sect now carried out attacks in both Niger and Chad within a week, making those countries to pay for their participation in the Joint force. The pertinent question to ask “is can the terrorists fight on four fronts at the same time?” Well, from the mode of their attack, it seems that they are incapable to achieved this aim, because unlike Nigeria where there are unemployed youth willing to death for a

wrong course, Boko Haram could not get such support in other countries in the region. Clearly, Boko Haram wants to show that its can strike whenever it wants, but so far, its attacks are mainly launched from Nigeria on other nations and no local support in neighboring countries. This made it difficult for its operation to be successful unlike in Nigeria where its has a lot of local sponsors and supporters. The target of Boko Haram insurgency are mainly men, women and children, this highlights that the group's brutality and barbarism know no bounds (Kirby, 2015). Kelly *et al.* (2015) listed kidnapping, robbery, drugs, small arms trading, support from other terrorists group among others as sources of financing Boko Haram terrorists in Lake Chad Basin. The Table A–D below highlighted an extract of attacks of Boko Haram in Lake Chad Basin by country wise.

#### *Boko Haram Attacks in Cameroon*

Nigeria-based Boko Haram, which in the year 2014 became “*the West African franchise of the Islamic State group has targeted northern Cameroon repeatedly in retaliation for Cameroon’s participation in a regional military effort against the extremists*” (PMNews, 2015). There are varieties of reasons for Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon, apart from retaliation, other ranges from killings innocent people, kidnapping for ransoms, kidnapping girls and used them as porters, cooks and sex slaves. Cameroon became a target of Boko Haram insurgency due to the fact that Cameroonian authority refuses to provide safe-haven for the terrorists to carry out attacks on Nigeria soil and run into hiding in Far North region, in Cameroon. The terrorists perceived Cameroon as unfriendly neighbor and hence the numerous attacks in the country. Table A below analyzed the timeline of Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon. There are various strategies adopted by Cameroonian authority in combating the insurgency, deploying Rapid Reaction Forces, (known by their French acronym BIR) have succeeded in deterring many attacks of Boko Haram sects and find Cameroon a ‘no-go-area’ for the insurgency. BIR are Cameroon’s Israeli-trained fighting forces with modern equipment in counter-terrorism (such as American and Israeli assault and sniper rifles, 50mm heavy machine guns, 105mm cannon and mortars) (Hilsum, 2015). The force (BIR) apart from fighting any intending attacks, always mount regular patrols in the villages in the Far North region.

*Table A. Timeline of Boko Haram attacks in Cameroon*

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location of attack</b>	<b>Nature of attack</b>	<b>Causalities</b>
December 28–29, 2014	Far North Region	Attack on the region by Boko Haram sect and counter-attack by Cameroonian Soldiers	85 civilians, 94 militants, and 2 Cameroonian soldiers are killed in the clash

Date	Location of attack	Nature of attack	Causalities
January 2, 2015	Waza	Boko Haram militants attack a bus in Waza, Cameroon.	11 People Killed and 6 injured in the attack
January 12, 2015	Kolofata	Boko Haram terrorists launched a failed raid on Kolofata in Cameroon. The raid met a tough counter from the Cameroonian military	1 Army lost his life and between 143-300 rebels was killed by army
January 16, 2015	Cameroon	Chad Military sent helping hand to Cameroon to assist in fighting against Boko Haram insurgents	No Causality
January 17, 2015	Cameroon	Russian ambassador pledges to supply Cameroon with more modern weapons to combat the Boko Haram insurgents	No Causality
January 18, 2015	North Cameroon	Kidnaping attack	80 People Kidnapped and 3 Killed
January 31, 2015	Cameroon	AU (African Union) pledges to send up to 7,500 international soldiers to aid Nigeria's fight against Boko Haram Insurgency. Chadian Soldiers fought heavily against the sects and killed many	120 fighters killed and lost 3 soldiers
February 4, 2015	Fotokol	Boko Haram terrorists raid the Cameroonian town of Fotokol in Far North Region	Scores of people killed

**Source:** Extract from Johnson-Rokosu and Kelly (2016)

#### *Boko Haram Attacks in Chad*

It is often said that the best form of defense is attack. This preposition seems to be the guiding principle of the Boko Haram sects in attacking Chad. As soon as Chad joined the allied forces (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) to combat the insurgency in the region, the first attack was carried out on Chad soil. Fighters came to Chad crossing Lake Chad in four motorboats and attacked a village. However, the terrorists were pushed back by the Chadian military. Apart from Nigeria, Chad seems to be heavily involved in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in the

region using both land army and military aircraft to strikes the militant's bases. Chad is the base for a French regional counter-insurgency operation 'Barkhane' which provides intelligence and logistical support to the Chadian army (ChannelsTV, 2015).

*Table B. Timeline of Boko Haram attacks in Chad*

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location of attack</b>	<b>Nature of attack</b>	<b>Causalities</b>
February 4, 2015	Gambaru Ngala, Nigeria border town	Chad Army recaptured the border town of Gambaru Ngala between Chad and Nigeria	killed 200 militants and lost nine soldiers
February 13, 2015	Ngouboua	Boko Haram militants attack Chad for the first time after 30 fighters crossed Lake Chad in four motorboats and attacked the village of Ngouboua this was at the time Chad joined Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon in a military coalition against Boko Haram sect	No record
February 24, 2015	Gambaru	Clash between Chadian soldiers and Boko Haram Sect near the town of Gambaru, close to Nigeria's border with Cameroon	Over 200 Boko Haram fighters killed and 1 Chad Army soldier killed and 9 are wounded
June 16, 2015	N'Djamena	First attack on Chadian soil. Twin Suicide Bomb attacks in Chad capital was blamed on Boko Haram jihadists n the first such attacks in Chad's capital N'Djamena targeted the police headquarters and a police academy	24 people killed and more than 100 wounded
June 17, 2015	Chad	Following the two suicide bomb attacks Chad bans Burqas and Tinted Cars, vehicles with tinted windows. Also, Chad has banned people from wearing the full-face veil	No casualty
July 4-5, 2015	Merom and Tiskra (Lake Chad)	Boko Haram attacked and raided two villages (Merom and Tiskra) in Lake Chad, killing, slitting the throats of their victims and burning down houses before escaping.	26 killed

**Source:** *Extract from Johnson-Rokosu and Kelly (2016)*

In the coalition, Chad have the region's most effective military with her airstrikes against the jihadist group both in Nigeria and Cameroon, with well positioned and stationed troops in the border areas around Lake Chad, which other countries in the region are not able to provide. This singular military prowess of Chad made them target of the Boko Haram terrorists who has intensified its attacks against Chad in response, forcing thousands to flee their homes. Table B analyzes extract of Boko Haram attacks on Chad.

*Boko Haram Attacks in Niger*

Like Chad republic, Niger incurred the wrath of Boko Haram terrorists and recent attacks on Niger could be traced to the country participation in the four-nation coalition forces to push the militants out of the region. A spate of Boko Haram attacks in Niger's southeast Diffa region following weeks of relative calm and upsurge on civilians comes after the country joining the coalition. Table C below analyzed recent attacks of Boko Haram terrorists in Niger.

Table C. Timeline of Boko Haram attacks in Niger

Date	Location of attack	Nature of attack	Causalities
February 6, 2015	Bosso and Diffa	First known attack of Boko Haram in Niger towns of Bosso and Diffa. This raid was repelled by combined forces of Nigerien and Chadian military	5 Nigeriens and 109 Boko Haram militants are killed as well.
February 9, 2015	Diffa	Boko Haram launch a raid on a prison in the town of Diffa in Niger. Authorities repel the attack	No causality recorded
July 9, 2015	Bosso	Boko Haram terrorists attacked the village of Dagaya near Bosso and slit the throat of their victims	5 civilians killed

**Source:** Extract from Johnson-Rokosu and Kelly (2016)

*Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria*

Without doubt, Nigeria is the main base of Boko Haram attacks in Lake Chad basin region. According to Shola (2015), Boko Haram is the reflection of the Nigeria society which pictures a wealthy country yet so poor, so deprived in spite of her endowment, making her citizens to wallow in abject poverty. Muraina *et al.* (2014) asserted that Lake Chad basin region especially Nigeria has witnessed brutal confrontation and massive assault from terrorist groups which are undoubtedly the most blood-thirsty and destructive, both in term of demonic brutality, mindless

savagery and flagrant disobedience to the principles of peace and stability in the region'. The discourse of Boko Haram insurgency clearly revealed that Nigeria is confronted with security challenges (Shuaibu *et al.*, 2015) which is manifested in murderous campaigns against securities agencies, government institutions, religious cleric and member of the general public. Table D are neither exhaustive nor terminal, it is obvious that Boko Haram terrorist group attacks in Lake Chad basin have surged rather than ebbed – an indication that the group's activities have been expanding progressively in terms of scope, severity and targets from 2009 to the present time (Kelly *et al.*, 2015).

*Table D. Timeline of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria (2014-2015)*

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location of attack</b>	<b>Nature of attack</b>	<b>Causalities</b>
2009	Plateau State	The Boko Haram crisis, which is still ravaging Nigeria to date started formally in 2009 with the sectarian religious violence between rival Islamic groups in Plateau State	
January 2010	Dala Alemderi	the group struck again in the Nigerian state of Borno, killing four people in Dala Alemderi ward in Maiduguri metropolis	4 people were killed
June 16, 2011	Abuja	Bombing of the Nigeria Police Headquarters, Abuja the group claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on the police force headquarters in Abuja that occurred the previous day. Officials believed that the attack was the first suicide bombing in Nigeria's history and that it specifically targeted Police Inspector-General Hafiz Ringim. ( <a href="http://www.naijan.com">www.naijan.com</a> )	
August 26, 2011	Abuja	Bombing of the United Nations (UN) House in Abuja	twenty-three persons were killed and 129 others injured
December 25, 2011	Suleja	Multiple bomb attacks killed dozens including 35 worshippers at St. Therasa Catholic Church, Madalla, Suleja	
January 2012		January of 2012 saw Boko Haram's most deadly single day assault, with bomb and gun attacks killing an estimated 185 people.	
December 25 2012	Borno State	in Borno State, Islamic militants attacked a church on Christmas day; afterwards the church was set on fire and killed people	killed 27 people

Date	Location of attack	Nature of attack	Causalities
April 25 2013	Baga, Borno State	in Baga, Borno State, Muslims gathering for morning prayers and school children, book haram killed children and adults	killed 87 children and adults
September 20 2013	Borno State	in Borno State, boko haram sect made highway Ambush	142 corpses Evacuated from Bushes.
January 3–7, 2015	Baga, Borno State	Boko Haram militants raze the entire town of Baga in north-east Nigeria	Over 2000 people are killed
February 2, 2015	Gombe	Some few minutes after President Goodluck Jonathan left an election rally in the city of Gombe, a female suicide bomber attacks	1 person was killed and 18 people injured
March 2, 2015	Kondunga TOWn	Boko Haram militants disguised as herders were killed near Kondunga town in Borno State when they when for operation. Also, Chadian military recaptures the town of Dikwa in Borno State	73 Boko Haram terrorist Killed
June 22, 2015	Maiduguri	Two female suicide bombers invaded a crowded mosque and bombed the mosque to mark the start of Ramadan	30 people killed

**Source:** Extract from Kelly et al. (2015)

## 2.2. Drivers of Boko Haram insurgency in Lake Chad Basin

### *Poverty*

Poverty has been identified as one of the driving force of Boko Haram insurgency in the region. Poverty has become so endemic in the Lake Chad basin region and is regarded as the deprivation of basic needs which commonly known as to food, clothing, shelter healthcare and education. Over the years, the people of the region like other developing or underdeveloped nations are deprive of basic amenities and election years in such countries provide opportunity of politicians to promise that basic amenities will be provided. However, the introduction of religion into politic to cause divide and rule system, made the citizen to realize their poverty level and need to obtain some benefit from the system. Joining Boko Haram which provide alternative avenue to 'better life' after brainwashing is a tool in driving the insurgency in the area.

### *Illiteracy*

Illiteracy is a by-product of and drive force of poverty. In a situation that a young

man is poor, illiterate and unemployed, he becomes a clean slate for any kind of brainwashing. The dynamic forces of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment reinforce each other. Boko Haram at the outset appeared to have had its operational bases located in the poorest part of Northern Nigeria. It is in such place where people have been denied the opportunity to go to school as well have meaningful economic source of livelihood that recruitment is the easiest for Boko Haram leaders are aware of it and of course are maximizing the advantages of obvious truth. It is not any different from the situation that prevailed during the pre-amnesty militancy periods in the Niger delta. The long and short of it is that with entrenched poverty, illiteracy and unemployment we cannot eliminate the menace of Boko Haram or similar security threats (The Nation April 5, 2012).

### *Unemployment*

In Nigeria democracy has been restored for a over decade ago, which no doubt, open so much hope and expectations by the people for instance, it is assumed that with democracy, people would be free to choose their leaders and representative and hold them accountable for the over all objective of fast tacking development and improving the general living conditions of the masses. This expectation is not misplaced considering that Nigeria has abandoned human and natural resources. However, the reality on ground has shown that this expectation is yet to be realized. Hence, the growing sense of despondency among the masses.

The problem of chronic youth unemployment is very evident in Nigeria. Every year thousands of graduate are turn out for where there are no jobs. Nigerians street are littered with youth hawkers who ordinarily would have found gainful employment in some enterprises, or would have demonstrated their skill and resourcefulness if there is enabling environment structure on ground. Instead, the youth have now shifted their attention to terrorism (Adepebo, 2011).

Unemployment describes the conditions of people who are without jobs. The international labour organization (ILO) defines the unemployment as number of the economically active population who are without work but available for and seeking for work (Adebayo, 1999). Government at all level should strive to creates viable structure which will encourage the youth to think rationally towards job creation rather than job piferage and almost unending unemployment proliferation in vogue in Nigeria Youth unemployment therefore could be described as the conglomerate of youths with diverse background, willing and able to work, but cannot find any type of job that they are trained to do and which they will be proud to do as there area of expertise. When the supply of labour outstrips the demand for labour, it causes joblessness and unemployment (Echebiri, 2005).

### *Ethnic factor*

Viewing from the activities and its modus operandi, it becomes confusing for one to adequately position its ethnic together, they carry out violent activities in the northern part of the country, it has a greater extent compromise the effort of security activities in the part of the country. If the ethnic loyalty is not questionable, the group just as any other ethnic militia in the country should be concerned about the provision of security in its host ethnic origin. This clearly establishes the fact that ethnic identity is not the prerequisite of the Boko Haram Islamic sect. what the Boko Haram sect want is for a certain law (Sharia Law) to be adopted in the twelve (12) northern states including the federal capital territory (FCT). This request has brought about mixed interpretation of the ethnic factors of the Boko Haram sect. it can be said that apart from the struggle for the implementation of the sharia law, the activities and the group have been ambiguous and this make its ethnic loyalty questionable (Shehu, 2007).

### *Political factor*

The dispute over 2011 election result which left over eight hundred dead, also has played a role in Boko Haram's escalating violence. Many northern Nigerians view the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian as illegitimate, arguing that he ignored an informal power-rational agreement that should have kept a Muslim as president this. (Muslim president Umar Musa ya'dua died in 2120, two years into his four years term). Leadership Newspaper 2012). Voting irregularities during the election as well as effort to change presidential term limits further alienated the north from Jonathan. The Boko Haram sect also wants political power in the nation, thereby making a northern or Muslim as the president. They don't want to see Christian or southern as the president because they believe that the west is a corrupting influence in governance. Some Jonathan supporters argue Boko Haram attacks as an attempt possibly funded by northern elites to make the country ungovernable and uncomfortable for the federal government and the society at large.

### *Religious Factor*

The Boko Haram though an Islamic terrorist sect has assumed a very radical posture. The group considers whether Christian or Muslim an infidel if such a person does not adhere strictly to its principles. It cannot be actually said if the member of this group belong to the Muslim religion. This is because they pray in a separate mosque, dress differently, have many rules guiding its activities which are not the same with the widely accepted Muslim teaching globally.

According to Imam (2004) at no time did the (Muslim) jurist approve of terrorism, nor

indeed is there any evidence of the use of terrorism in Islamic tradition, Muslims are commanded not to kill women, children or the aged, not to torture or otherwise ill. The above caption sum up the religious factor and the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria. The group has its own ideology which its members adhere to anything outside from it, is contrary to its belief.

### 3. Methodology of research

The research method used in this study is, mixed research method because both primary and secondary data are used. In adopting qualitative research method, trend and content analytical method was employed and the reason for the adoption of this method is basically because the study relied on documentary evidence in data collection. Survey research method was adopted with a sample size of 300 to obtain primary data from academic and professional in accounting, law, psychology and anti-terrorism/fraud agencies both in Nigeria and Cameroon who have a fair knowledge of terrorism financing, money laundering and fraud/ forensic accounting related matters. Out of 300 questionnaire administered in both countries (Cameroon and Nigeria) only 265 was returned, that is, 11.67% not returned.

### 4. Findings and Discussions


Finding in this study are discussed in this section as it relates to the impact of Boko Haram activities on socio political situation in Lake Chad basin.

#### *Impact of Boko Haram activities on Socio Political Realities*

The respondents were asked to answer YES or NO to a question on their opinion on the effect of Boko Haram attacks on socio-economic and political realities in affected area of Lake Chad basin. Table 1 and figure A show that 238 (90 per cent) of the total respondents answered YES to the notion and 27 (10 per cent) strongly disagreed with the notion. It can be inferred from this findings government ability in Lake Chad basin to cut the sources of terrorist finance will significantly affect Boko Haram activities and attacks.

*Table 1. Impact of Boko Haram activities on socio political realities*

		Academicians		Professionals		Totals	
			%		%		%
Valid	YES	6	86%	232	90%	238	90%
Q4	NO	1	14%	26	10%	27	10%
	Total	7	100%	258	100%	265	100%




*Blocking terrorism financing source*

The study examined the socio political and economic activities in Lake Chad basin nations and Boko Haram activities. Finding revealed that the increase in Boko Haram activities in recent time in the region have negatively impact on the socio political/economic activities and these is due partly to increase in terrorist financing. For example, 84% of the respondents are of the opinion that terrorist financing has significant relationship with negative socio political activities and 2% strongly disagree with this notion. One of the strategies to deflate the menace of Boko Haram in the region apart from military action is to block the sources of terrorism financing.

Table 2. Blocking terrorism financing sources

		Academicians		Professionals		Totals	
			%		%		%
Valid	SA	4	57%	219	85%	223	84%
Q5	A	3	43%	25	10%	28	11%
	UD	0	0%	8	3%	8	3%
	D	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%
	SD	0	0%	5	2%	5	2%
	Total	7	100%	258	100%	265	100%



*Factors instigating Boko Haram attacks*

Many factors can be adduced as driving force that motivates Boko Haram activities in the region. Analysis of item Q5 revealed that majority of the respondents ranked three (3) items out of 5 as major factors aiding Boko Haram terrorist group activities. The respondents basically agreed with the notion that Lack of government support for armed forces and low moral (73%); Lack of government political will (54%); Political interest (45%) contribute to the rise of terrorism. While Unemployment/under-development/education deficiency region (51%) and Neglects by government (51%) are ranked equally as contributing to increase in Boko Haram terrorist group.

*Table 3. Factors aiding Boko Haram terrorist group activities*

	SA	A	UD	D	SD
Lack of government political will	54%	20%	11%	12%	3%
Elite direct/indirect sponsorship	45%	23%	8%	7%	17%
Lack of government support for armed forces and low moral	73%	15%	1%	8%	2%
Unemployment/under-development/education deficiency in the region	51%	11%	5%	18%	15%
Neglects by government	51%	22%	4%	14%	10%

Hypothesis 1 Test:

*H01: There is no positive association between Boko Haram insurgency and socio-economic/Political realities in Lake Chad Basin*

In testing proposition 1, Pearson Chi-square test .178 or 17.8% reveals that there is positive association between the menace of Boko Haram insurgency and Socio economic/political realities in Lake Chad basin. From table 4, the fact of the high rate of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria and recent attacks in other nations in Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Cameroon and Niger) collaborate this assumption. This recent attacks should present a serious concern to International donor agencies and countries to equip the joint coalition force in the fight against the insurgency.

Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and alternative which state that 'there is no positive association between Boko Haram insurgency and socio-economic/Political realities in Lake Chad Basin' is accepted.

*Table 4. Chi-Square Tests*

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.667 <sup>a</sup>	9	.178
Likelihood Ratio	11.090	9	.270
N of Valid Cases	6		

a. 16 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .17.

Hypothesis 2 Test:

*H<sub>02</sub>: Increase in Boko Haram activities has no significant relationship on poverty and unemployment in Lake Chad Basin.*

Findings shows that Boko Haram activities has significant relationship on poverty and unemployment in Lake Chad basin region. On whether the level of poverty and unemployment are the major contributing factors to the Boko Haram insurgency, finding in table 5 indicates that high rate of unemployment, illeteracy and poverty among the population in the affected area of Lake Chad basin made it easier for Boko Haram to convert the unemployed youth into army of insurgency thus fuelling the increase the activities of the sect in the region.

Finding in table 5, Pearson chi-square test reveals that .125 or 12.5% which is higher than the two-sided asymptotic significance of the chi-square statistic 0.10 (10%) affirmed the alternative hypothesis. That is, increase in Boko Haram activities has significant relationship on poverty and unemployment in Lake Chad. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesi is accepted.

Table 5. Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.000 <sup>a</sup>	6	.125
Likelihood Ratio	9.503	6	.147
McNemar-Bowker Test	.	.	. <sup>b</sup>
N of Valid Cases	7		

a. 12 cells (100.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .20.

b. Computed only for a PxP table, where P must be greater than 1.

## 5. Conclusions

Socio-economic and political implication of Boko Haram activities as listed in a study (Nkwede *et al.*, 2011) ranges from food security; sporadic migration and abandonment of profession; heightens indigenes/settlers dichotomy; discouragement of local foreign investment; dehumanization of women, children and men; deterioration of the nation's economy; diversion of attention and increased security vote to Boko Haram by government; increased school dropout; collapse of tourism industry; palpable fear among the citizen and destroys corporate image of Lake Chad basin nations especially Nigeria. Omode (2011) referred to government inability 'to bring about good and effective governance for its citizens led to frustration of rising expectations which has in turn resulted in all forms of violence in the region, including such crimes as kidnapping, armed robberies and most importantly terrorism which has reached its acme.

The Boko Haram insurgency has adversely affected the economy of the Lake Chad

basin and by extension Nigeria (Ejogba, 2015). As at 2012, the World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that the domestic economy lost a whopping N1.33 trillion Foreign Directs Investment (FDI), as a result of the activities of the Boko Haram (Okereocha, 2012). Winning the war against the Boko Haram insurgency required more than military action (Johnson-Rokosu and Kelly, 2016), other tactics and strategies are needed. The technical support and military hardware from international donor countries and agencies alone cannot solve the menace, if there is sincerity of purpose from the government in the region and international donors, the menace may be thing of the past soon. The study therefore suggests that effort should be made to enlighten the citizen in the Lake Chad basin of the evil of providing cover for the terrorists; established more schools and re-orientate the citizen; provide employment to arrest the unemployment realities that contributed significantly to Boko Haram recruitment. Also, rebuilding villages, town and settlement destroyed; paying compensation to the victim of the insurgency and resettle the citizen will go a long ways in solving the menace.

In conclusion, Lake Chad Basin nations should rather apply 'stick and carrot' method in dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency. Brutal force as conflict management strategy cannot work, rather government in the region should work more on strengthening the governance system, free electoral system, focus on program that can bring development into the area in partnership with international donor countries and agencies, reduce poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and corruption at al level.

## References

- Asika, N. (2009). *Research Methodology in the Behavioral Sciences*. Lagos: Longman Nigeria, p. 44
- Campbell, J.,(2014b). Boko Haram: Origins, Challenges and Responses. *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre*
- ChannelsTV (2015). Boko Haram Attacks Chad, Kill One. *Channels Television*, March 16. <http://www.channelstv.com/2015/03/16/boko-haram-attacks-chad-kills-one/>
- Dennis, N. (2012). History and Origin of Boko Harm People. Accessed online July 12, 2015, <http://nwabuisidennis.blogspot.com/2012/01/history-and-origin-of-boko-harampeople.html>
- Ejogba, O.A. (2015). The Economic and Security Implcations of Boko Haram Terrorism. *International Journal of African and Asian Studies*. Vol.10. pp.6-12
- Hilsum, L. (2015). Inside Nigeria's Sambisa forest, the Boko Haram hideout where kidnapped school girls are believed to be held. *Channel 4 News*.

<http://www.channel4.com/news>

Johnson-Rokosu, S.F., and Kelly, M. K. (2016) *Winning the Boko Haram Terrorism War (Combating Terrorism Financing and Counter-Insurgency Strategies)*

Kelly, M.K., Johnson-Rokosu, S.F., Olanrewaju, R.A. (2015). Combating boko haram terrorism financing: Case of Nigeria and lake-chad basin", *International Journal of Current Research*, 7, (11), 22849-22861.

Kirby, J. (2015). U.S. Condemns Boko Haram Attacks in Chad. *Press Statement by U.S. Department of State Spokesperson.*

Muraina, M.B., Uyanga, U.D., Muraina, K.O. (2014). Historical Antecedents of Boko Haram Insurgency and Its Implications for Sustainable and Educational Development in North Central Nigeria. *Journal of Education and Practice*, Vol.5, No.22, 2014, pp. 59 - 65

Nkwede, J.O., Abah, E.O., Nwankwo, O.U. (2015). Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. *International Journal of Sustainable Development*. 8(6). pp.59-72

Omode, A.,(2011). Nigeria: Analysing the security challenges of Goodluck Jonathan administration. *Canadaian Social Science*, 7 (5), pp. 90 -102

Okereoca, C.(2012). Heartache for the Economy' *Tell Magazine*, May 14, pp.46-47

Okoro, E.R. (2015). Terrorism and governance crisis: The Boko Haram experience in Nigeria.

Shola, O.J. (2015) Globalization of Terrorism: A case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*. 6 (6.1) pp. 1- 22

Shuaibu, S.S., Salleh, M.A., Shehu, A.Y. (2015). The impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigeria National Security. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*. 5(6), pp. 254-265.