Sino-Indian Border Relationship From 1914-1962
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Abstract
As the two populous nations and Asia’s largest and most dynamic societies, China and India have become the world’s most important fastest growing Economies. And beyond any doubt their participation and influence in regional and world affairs has increased over the time. However the relationship between the two Asian giants has not been an easy one. The Border dispute, a colonial legacy, has existed since the very beginning of the relationship between the two new nation-states, established at the end of the 1940’s. The border issue is one of the most protracted and complicated problem between the two countries. In fact the border issue does not stand alone but is related to many other bilateral and international issues. The balance of power in Asia depends largely on the peaceful co-existence of India and China.

The sino-Indian border stretches over 2500 miles from kasmir in the North West alone the Himalayan ranges up to the Tri Junction of Burma, China and India Near the Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh. In The Western sector it extends alone the watershed formed by the Mustagh and karakoram and The Kuen lun range to the point east of longitude 800. There after it moves south along the watershed thorough the Lanak pass and along the Chang Chameo range. It then follows the water shed between the ganges and Sutlej to the Tri Junction of India, Nepal and China. The boundary of Sikim and Tibet is also a watershed while the west of the Himalayas constitute the boundary between Bhutan and Tibet. The north-east frontier of India is approximately 710 miles long from the estern confine of Bhutan to the point near Talu pass and is the northen watershed of Brahmaputra excepting where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansri and Namjang river break trough.

Indian View regarding the demarcation of Boundary is different from that of China. Indian view is that the boundary has been recognized by tradition and Custom and for centuries it has determined the limits of administration since last 300 years. And hence the boundary can be treated as formally settled through as historical demarcation . (Dr. Rajendra Prasad, ‘Sino- India’ border dispute’, Seminar paper. Dept. of defense and strategic Studies, University of Gorakhpur, 1884).

1.1 Statement of the Problem
As the two most populous nations and Asia’s two largest and most dynamic societies, China and India have become the world’s most important fastest growing economies. And beyond any doubt their participation and influence in regional and world affairs has increased over the time. However the relationship between the two Asian giants has not been an easy one. The Border dispute, a colonial legacy, has existed since the very beginning of the relationship between the two new nation-states, established at the end of the 1940s. The border issue is one of the most protracted and complicated problem between the two countries. In fact the border issue does not stand alone but is
related to many other bilateral and international issues. The balance of power in Asia depends largely on the peaceful co-existence of India and China.

The Sino-Indian border stretches over 2500 miles from Kashmir in the North West along the Himalayan ranges up to the Tri Junction of Burma, China and India near the Talu Pass in Arunachal Pradesh. In the Western sector it extends along the watershed formed by the Mustagh and Karakoram and the Kuen Lun ranges to the point east of Longitude 800. Thereafter it moves south along the watershed through the Lanak Pass and along the Chang Chamo range. It then follows the watershed between the Ganges and Sutlej to the Tri Junction of India, Nepal and China. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet is also a watershed while the west of the Himalayas constitute the boundary between Bhutan and Tibet. The North East frontier of India is approximately 710 miles long from the eastern confine of Bhutan to the point near Talu Pass and is the Northern watershed of Brahmaputra excepting where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansri and Namjang rivers break through.

The northern Himalayan border of India with China has never been officially demarcated on the ground due to geographical nature of the area. The area is so inaccessible that it is very difficult even to reach some places. Therefore, India relied on natural frontiers in determining her northern boundary. The Himalayan ‘no man’s land’ kept away both Indian and China from political and military confrontation for centuries. Both the countries flourished in their own independent ways through the ages.

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1.2 Objectives of Study

The objectives of the dissertation is to study the nature of Sino-Indian relationship based on the border issues within the period of 1914-1962. And also to study the outcome of the relations based on border questions.

1.3 Methodology

This study is based on secondary sources. In order to study the India China conflict on border issue, historical approach has been adopted. The claims and counter claims have been examined with the help of using related sketches and maps.

1.4 Survey of Literature

Dr. M.L. Sali in his book “India China Border Dispute” deals with the historical, geographical and geopolitical perspectives of the eastern sector of Sino-Indian border with India’s legitimate right. The book deals thoroughly the Sino-Indian border relations from very past to the present in a useful manner.

Through “Across Borders”, J.N. Dixit traces the origins of India’s foreign policy from 1947 onwards with bold, powerful and authoritative strokes. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 has been presented with India’s international relationship with reference to specific events.
“Foreign policy of India” by N. Jayapalan deals with all aspects of the foreign policy of India in detail during different phases in a Chronological order. Special importance has been given for the topic Panchshila as the fundamental basis of our foreign policy.

John Rowland through his book “A History of Sino-Indian Relations : Hostile co-existence” gives important insights into Himalayan boundary regions that separates India from communist China. By giving accurate dimensions to the Chinese threat confronting India, the author provides clues to the crucial question on Chinese intentions in Asia.

Suchita Ghosh in her book “Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations” provides a detail account of the Tibetan question directly effecting the Sino-Indian relationship. The book highlights India’s policy towards Tibet and the consequent Chinese blame of “Western aggression” and Indian expansion in Tibet.

1.5 The Geographical Delimitation

The northern border of India lies along the great Himalayan mountains range and defined by treaty and customs by the two countries in the past. For thousands of year, the Himalayas had been considered as a dividing wall between India, China and Tibet. The geographical delimitation of India China border can be divided into Western sector, the central sector and the Eastern sector.

I. Western Sector

The boundary in the western sector between Jammu and Kashmir with Sinkiang and Tibet is about 1770 kms. This boundary runs along the Mustagh Range and Aghil Rang across the Karakoram pass along the main Kuen Lun Ranges to a point East of Longitude 80° E and 24 km north of Haji Langer.

The Ladakh region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has a Himalayan border of 560 km on the north and east. The Aksai-Chin region is a kind of ‘no man’s land’. While a part of the Indian border with Sinkiang is occupied by Pakistan (See Map-1)
While the traditional frontier of Himachal Pradesh follows the water parting between the Spiti and the Para Chu rivers and then continues along the watershed between the Eastern and the western tributaries of the Sutlej. The total length of Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border is 300 kms.

II. The Central Sector

The state of Uttar Pradesh has a 400 km long Himalayan border. The Uttar Pradesh boundary lies on the water parting between Sutlej and the Bhagirathi. The boundary crosses the Sutlej near the Shipki La on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border. From there it runs along watershed passes of Mana, Nit, Jungi-Bingri, Dharma and Lipu Lekh and finally joins the Tri-Junction of China, Nepal and India.

III. The Eastern Sector

In the eastern sector Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh shares the border lines with China. Sikkim’s boundary with China extends for a distance of about 225 kms. While the line between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet (McMahan Line) is of 1140 kms.

1.6 Territorial Claims by China and India on Himalayan Border Areas

China’s Claim

According to Peking, the boundary as drawn in Indian maps cut about 38000 square kilometers deep into Chinese territory. The Chinese claim that neither British nor Indian administration has ever extended to these places in the past or the present. The Chinese claim about 50,000 square miles of Indian Territory. The disputed area has been presented below-

Map-2

Source: Google map, access Date : 03-05-2013
The boundary of Jammu and Kashmir with Sinkiang and with Tibet is a disputed territory measuring about 13000 to 15000 kms. In this area China claims the Aksai Chin district, the Changchenmo Valley, Pengong Lake and the Spangur Tso area of Northern Ladakh as well as entire Eastern Ladakh.

Regarding the boundary with Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh with Tibet, the Chinese claim nearly 1300 square kilometers in this area. While in the Eastern sector, the Chinese claim about 94700 square kilometers of Indian territory including the Kameng Frontier division and three fourths of the Lohit division of North East frontier Agency, ‘NEFA’. (Present Arunachal Pradesh)

India’s Claim : India claims that China have occupied 2500 square miles in the western sector (Ladakh) in addition to 12000 square miles occupied in 1962 through aggression (Map 3). In the Eastern Sector, 20,000 square miles of India territory is under illegal occupation of China after declaring unilateral cease fire on 21 November, 1962. Since this territory has been forcefully occupied by China, she must vacate it. (Government of India, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute; Questions and Answers, pp. 23-24, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1963)

1.7 Attempt of Demarcation

From 1684 to 1914 attempts were made by the British Indian Government (earlier attempts were made by native rulers of Kashmir and Kingdoms located in the sector) to demarcate India’s northern border with Tibet and China. But due to the difficult geographical nature and location the boundary
were delimited on the basis of ‘geographical factor’. The lack of scientific and technical equipment also stood on the way. Meanwhile the Russian southward expansion was a serious threat to British Indian empire. The British Indian Government consequently made efforts to demarcate the Ladakh’s border with Tibet and Sinkiang. But the Chinese attitude of indifference left the frontier undemarcated.

The MacDonald line of 1899 was an attempt on the part of British Indian Government to avoid any dispute regarding the frontier in the future. Here as well the Chinese response was negative. In the meantime however, Chinese and the Tibetans continued to encroach in the Indian territories in the North West. The British consequently negotiated with the Tibetans and the Chinese over the boundary at Simla in 1914. Here the motive of British behind the delimitation of Kashmir’s boundary was a part of Cold war strategy to secure the northern borders from a possible Russian threat.

The Simla Conference of 1914

The Simla conference began in India’s then summer capital in October 1913. The host and British delegate was Sir Henry McMahan, secretary of the Government of India who assumed the role of ‘mediator’ between the other two participants; Tibet and China. The Tibetan delegate was Lon-Chen Shatra, a chief minister in Lhasa. The Chinese were represented by Ivan Chen.

The main point of contention during the six month of negotiations was the boundary between China and Tibet. Here McMohan presented the proposal of creating an Outer and an Inner Tibet. Undoubtedly he was influenced by the new Mangolian pattern in which Outer Mongolia became an autonomous buffer responsive to Russia, while Inner Mongolia remained a province of China. The Outer Tibet (area traditionally under Lhasas control) had to be independent of its own internal affairs and to serve as a buffer between India and China. While the proposed Inner Tibet would serve as a buffer between Lhasas Tibet and Russian dominated Outer Mongolia.

McMohan was an enthusiastic believer in the buffer concept. He compared “frontier” with “buffer” and defined each as a tract of neutral territory separating two potentially antagonistic neighbours. He believed that it was the frontier buffer zone which had more significance compare to boundary line, particularly when it run through uninhabitable mountain or desert yet it was the inability of China and Tibet to agree on a boundary between inner and outer Tibet that prevented China from ratifying the Simla convention.

In the light of the current China India border dispute it is significant that the India Tibet boundary itself proposed at Simla did not cause any difficulty. This line known since as the McMohan line runs along the crest of the Himalayan watershed in India’s north eastern frontier area. By this delimitation McMohan sought to make Assam Himalaya secure and remove any ambiguity about India’s sovereignty over the tribal areas on the mountains southern tracks.

China raised no objection to McMohan formula at Simla in 1914 or during several years following the conference. This kept British hope of Peking’s acceptance of the convention. But in 1960 during boundary discussions with India the communist Chinese negotiators denied that the Tibet India boundary question had ever been raised at Simla. They alleged that the subject had been discussed only secretly behind the back of their delegate.

In fact at Simla when Ivan Chen the Chinese delegate explained that he was not yet authorized to join in boundary discussions McMahan suggested that to save time he discuss it with the Tibetan delegate.(report of the officials of the governments of India and the peoples republic of china on the
boundary question government of India ministry of external affairs 1961, p112) Chen did not raise any objection to this proposal and bilateral discussions were held between January 15 and January 31, 1914 in the midst of the Simla convention. An exchange of letters between the British and Tibetan representatives on March 24 and March 25 worked out the results of these discussions by finalizing the Anglo Tibetan boundary agreement of 1914. on July 3, 1914 the Simla convention was signed by Britain and Tibet. The Chinese government refused to be a party to it though Ivan Chen had initiated the draft agreement- a step that usually suggests informal acceptance.

1.8 Question of Tibet in Sino-Indian Relation

Throughout the history, Tibet enjoyed the status of an independent state. During the Manchu regime, Tibet was attacked by China from 1720 to 1792 A.D. Even then the Tibetan government maintained its own currency, foreign affairs and operated its own army, on account of weak imperial power in China.

India on the other hand had a close cultural contact with Tibet in addition to certain political and economic rights there. The British military expedition to Lhasa under colonel Young Husband resulted the Lhasa convention of September 1904. The convention recognized the British right to establish trade agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung without any reference to China. A British mission was maintained in Lhasa from 1936 to 1947 which dealt directly with the Tibetan Government. In July, 1947, the British and the Indian Governments formally informed the Tibetan Government that after the transfer of power, British’s obligations and rights under the existing treaties would be enjoyed by India. The British Mission at Lhasa formally became the Indian Mission on August 15, 1947. And the Tibetan Government formally announced its acceptance of the formal relationship with Independent India.

On 7th October 1950, without any warning or ultimatum troops of Chinese peoples Liberation army entered Tibet “to liberate the people of Tibet from imperialism”. Peking announced that “units of the Chinese peoples army have been ordered to cross over into Tibet in order to free three million Tibetans from Western Imperialist oppression and to consolidate national defenses on Chinese Western border. (Chakravarti:1961:12)

Replying to India’s suggestion of settling the Tibetan question by peaceful means, China sent a note to Government of India containing offensive language on October 30, 1950. The Chinese stated that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and that the problem of Tibet is entirely the domestic problem of China on which no foreign interference shall be tolerated. (Chattarjee:1990:78)

The Chinese military action in Tibet forced the Tibetan government to accept Chinese suzerainty, while India surrendered her special rights in Tibet on the face of a superior military might. The seventeen point agreement of 23 May, 1951 between China and Tibet allowed China to station her troops on Tibetan frontier. The Chinese occupation of Tibet was a diplomatic defeat for India, since for centuries Tibet had served as a buffer state between India and China.

Panchsheel Agreement

The seventeen point Agreement strengthened Chinese tactical and strategic position in Tibet. Hence to eliminate Indian influence in Tibet, China proposed the Panchsheel Agreement to India. Government of India realized that under new set up in Tibet it was essential to revise and redefine the treaty rights. It was on 28th April, 1954 that an agreement on ‘trade and intercourse’ between
India and China was signed. The agreement better known as ‘Panchsheel Treaty’ included five principles. Those are-

I. Mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty.
II. Mutual non aggression.
III. Mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs.
IV. Equality and mutual benefit and
V. Peaceful co-existence

Through the “Panchsheel Agreement” India officially recognized Tibet as a part of China As a matter of fact the “Panchsheel Agreement” marks an important chapter in India’s withdrawal from Tibet under the Chinese pressure. India came to conclusion that Chinese acceptance of “mutual respect for each others territorial integrity” without question by Peking of the existing frontier between India and Tibet, means there was no border dispute with China.

Tibetan Revolt and Escape of Dalai Lama to India

The era 1951-1959 witnessed the gradual and systematic breaking of major assurances contained in the Sino-Tibetan agreement which ultimately resulted in open clashes between Tibetans and Chinese. In March 1959 there was open revolt against the Chinese forces at Lhasa resulting massacre of a large number of Tibetan people.

On March 31, 1959, Dalai Lama fled from Tibet and came to India. He along with 13000 Tibetan refugee were accepted by Government of India as political refugees. However, condition was put on them not to carry ‘political activities’ from Indian soil.

The revolt in Tibet marked the beginning of the end of “honeymoon” of Sino-Indian relationship. On 25th April, 1959, the Peking Radio warned “British imperialists and Indian expansionists had better clarify their mind or they will suffer a tragic end”. (Government of India, ‘Parliamentary Debates’, Col. 1360)

1.9 Chinese Cartographic Aggression of 1950s

Between 1949 to 1958, people’s republic of China never raised any dispute regarding her borders with India, but carried on cartographic aggression against India. The following Indian territories were shown as Chinese territories in their maps:

i. Four divisions of Arunachal Pradesh.
ii. Some areas in the North of the state of Uttar Pradesh.
iii. Large areas in the Eastern Ladakh which is a part of Kashmir.

In 1954, during his visit to China Nehru raised the question of Chinese Cartographic aggression with his Chinese counterpart Chou-En-Lai. Chou replied that these were only reproductions of old maps and the peoples Government had no time to revise them. (Government of India, Notes Memorandum and Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-59, p. 49)

Ever after this, the Chinese aggression on maps against India continued. On August 21, 1958, Government of India gave a note to the Chinese counselor in New Delhi. However the Chinese reply was most diplomatic- “those maps were doubtless reproductions of old maps, but it had not yet undertaken a survey of China’s boundary nor consulted the countries concerned and pending such surveys and consultations, it would not make changes in the boundary on its own. (ibid, p. 46). It seems china reserved her right to declare at any time that the parts of Indian territories shown in the
Chinese maps as belonging to China, were a disputed territory. Between 1949 to 1958, the nature of China’s border policy with India can be called as “Reserve Policy”.

2.0 Chinese Intrusions and India’s forward policy

When China grabbed Tibet, India came under some sort of pressure. Immediately, India took steps to strengthen its position along the Himalayan frontier. The entrance to NEFA (present Arunachal Pradesh) was closed to all and patrolling of frontier by Assam Rifles was intensified. All these measures taken by India as the Chinese began to consolidate their position and set up posts along the Tibet border with India. Though at the diplomatic level “Hindi-Chini Vai Vai” slogan were being raised in both the countries, but at the same time troops of both the countries were employed along the frontier. Exchange of notes between the two governments regarding violation of the frontier had already started form July 1954.

i. China protested against the presence of Indian troops in the Uttar Pradesh at Barahoti. Chinese claimed Barahoti (they called it Wu-je) as their own and did not bother to check whether it was north or south of the border.

ii. After the Barahoti incident on 5\textsuperscript{th} November 1955 the Government of India complained to the Chinese counselor in New Delhi that a party of 20 Chinese soldiers had encrossed in Damzan and Nilang.

iii. On 24\textsuperscript{th} September 1956, India sent another protest note to China about the illegal entry of Chinese soldiers in Shipki La.

iv. In July, 1958, Government of India received information that the Chinese troops had intruded into Ladakh and occupied India’s Khurnak fort.

v. The Indian note of 17\textsuperscript{th} January, 1959 complained that the Chinese troops had illegally crossed the Lohit frontier division of India in September and October 1958.

vi. The Chinese constructed Sinkiang-Tibet highway through Aksai-Chin between 1956 and 1957. On 18\textsuperscript{th} October, 1958 when India gave a note about Sinkiang-Tibet highway crossing through the Indian territory, China replied that the region through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway passed belonged entirely to them.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru wrote to the Chinese Premier bringing to his notice the situation in the border area. In reply, Chou-En-Lai sent a letter to his Indian counterpart dated 23\textsuperscript{rd} January, 1959. This was the first time that China officially raised a border dispute with India and claimed 50,000 squares miles of Indian Territory and gave a historic twist to the Sino-Indian Relations for the first time in the century.

After Dalai Lama’s ‘asylum’ affair, China continued infiltration in the Indian border regions. Reports were also there of violations of Indian air space by Chinese aircraft. In reply China countered by asserting that Indian aircrafts violated Chinese air space and objected to the expulsion of representatives of Hsin-Hua News Agency. On 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 1961, China had proposed for negotiation a new agreement on trade and intercourse. India replied that negotiations could not be undertaken unless China withdraw its forces from the Indian territory and restored the “Status quo” as it existed in 1954.

The situation in border area became more tensed as time passed. The exchange of diplomatic protest notes and setting up military posts, deployments of troops along the frontier was going on between India and China on 8\textsuperscript{th} September, 1962, Chinese troops crossed the Mcmohan line in the Kameng Division of NEFA. On 13\textsuperscript{th} September, 1962 China repeated its proposal of withdrawing
the armed forces 20kms along the entire border and proposed 15th October, 1962, as a date for discussion. On 19th September 1962, India agreed to hold the discussion in order to remove the current tension in the border region. But on 20th September, 1962, Chinese forces crossed the McMohan Line in Thagla region and launched an assault against Indian post two miles East of Dhola. The Skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces for five days resulted situation “quite tense” along the North-East border. On 12th October, 1962, the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru told the press reporters that he had asked the Indian Armed forces to throw the Chinese back.

India’s forward Policy: To prevent Chinese intrusion into the Indian territory, the Eastern Army command received the orders to establish posts as close to the McMohan Line as possible in order to ensure the effective control of the frontier. India established military posts along the North and North-eastern frontier. There was no immediate reaction from China but it considered India’s forward policy as an “aggressive step”. And the Chinese continued intrusion into Indian territory which ultimately resulted in “skirmishers” between India and Chinese forces as existence of Indian military posts in border region. All last these “skirmishes” took the shape of “border war” on 20 October, 1962.

India’s defensive measures along with the North and Northeastern frontiers were only to stop further Chinese aggression into Indian territory. India’s defensive measures along the frontier misconceived as a “forward policy” and confirmed to the Chinese that the Indians were prepared to risk an armed conflict with China. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India’s foreign policy tried his best to settle the “border dispute” through negotiations but at last, his China policy proved to be a failure when the actual conflict started on 20th October, 1962

2.1 Chinese Aggression of 1962

On 20th October, 1962, the Chinese assaulted the Indian positions in the Western and Eastern sectors with heavy artillery and mortar fire. In the Western sector, Chinese attacked the Indian posts in the Chip Chap, Galwan and Pangang Tso areas. The Chinese were in overwhelming strength and attacking in all the sectors. Due to poor strategy and communication and transport network, Indian forces were ejected from eleven posts around Karakoram Pass. In spite of difficult situations, Indian army put up a very gallant defense. The Chinese were beaten with heavy casualties at Chushul. The outlying posts of Rezengla and Gurung hill and four posts in Spangur area were overwhelmed by the Chinese. Incidentally, Chinese realized that they had been confined only to the arid and inhospitable region of Ladakh. They also found difficulty in maintaining communication and transportation. And therefore they turned their attention to the more vulnerable and populous area of NEFA (Now Arunachal Pradesh).

Chinese attack was completely one sided affair, a great shock for India and the end of miscalculations, suspense and confusion. Tsangdhar fell on 22nd October, Bum La on 23rd and Tawang Headquarters of 7th infantry Brigade was also lost to the Chinese. The Government of India announced on 18th November, 1962 the fall of walong. The next day Bomdi La, the Headquarter of the Kameng division of the NEFA was captured by the Chinese. At this time, Chinese were in possession of all the territory which they had claimed in Ladakh and NEFA. The Chinese were only a few miles away from the plains of Assam. In the lohit sector they were not far away from the Oil fields and the tea plantations of North Assam.
2.2 Stand of International Community

When the situation created the possibility of Assam falling into the hands of Chinese, the Prime Minister of India requested the United States of America and Great Britain for help. Immediate response was given by U.S.A. and Great Britain. They provided India whatever they were asked to give. Air left was arranged and supplies of arms, ammunitions, communication means, transport planes started arriving at Calcutta and various places. High level delegation team of U.S.A. and Great Britain visited New Delhi to discuss India’s requirements. Mr. Duncan Sandy led the British delegation while Averell Harriman was the leader of the American delegation.

During a debate in the United Nations the representative of U.S.A. Adlai Stevenson drew attention to the “naked aggression” performed by China against India. Similar statements were also expressed by Great Britain, West Germany, France, Canada, Australia and other Countries who stood by the side of India when India needed support of international community.

The Soviet Union on the other hand saw a potent danger in Chinese attack on India as it helped China to establish its control over large area adjoint to Russia’s southern border so important for its security. The split of Sino-Soviet relationship during the 1950s also proved useful for India. Now Soviet Union saw a potent and reliable friend in India and hence it supported India and not China-a socialist country. Thus the fact of Sino-Soviet rivalry, particularly in the content of Sino-Indian conflict was a powerful factor. Soviet support to India became more after 1962. Even during the war of 1962, the Soviet Union indirectly helped India by cutting of additional oil supplies to China. (Premdev: 1984: 89)

2.3 Conclusion

We can see that both India and China had long standing tradition of historic friendship. The friendship continued as long as both were not very cautious about every inch of space in the barren land in the Himalaya. Before the communist party’s regime in China, Tibet had considerable independent status and cordial relationship with India. The emergence of Peoples Republic of China under the strong military leadership of Mao-Tse-Tung and her occupation of Tibet ultimately resulted in the origin of Border dispute with India. The border dispute assumed seriousness by the end of early 1960s which resulted the Chinese aggression in 1962, both the countries had taken a hard line and did not co-operate with each other for a period of two decades. Though the process of “normalization” started since 1980’s and continued with progress but the border issue remains unsolved and crucial in their relationship till date.

The Indian leadership displayed the lack of strategic foresight at the time of independence and for a number of years thereafter. Since Nehru government to till date India gave recognition to Tibet as an internal part of China. The solution of Indo-China border conflicts cannot be expected very soon. In fact, this problem has been shaped up as a “prestige issue” for two Asian giants before the eyes of the international community.

However very recent development in Sino-Indian relationship indicates improvements to some extent. A series of border talks have been organized since 1990s and the strategic Sino-Russo-India partnership and Sino-Indian strategic relationship of April 2005 have brought the two nations close to each other for mutual understanding.

As India and China are worlds two fastest and largest growing economics, they have also inner-dependence due to the globalization of modern economy. In fact the border tensions have largely
decreased in the fare of growing economic ties between the two countries. Balance of power in Asia largely depends on the peaceful co-existence of both India and China.

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