

Copyright © 2014 by Academic Publishing House *Researcher*



Published in the Russian Federation  
Voennyi Sbornik  
Has been issued since 1858.  
ISSN: 2309-6322  
Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 175-186, 2014

DOI: 10.13187/issn.2309-6322  
[www.ejournal6.com](http://www.ejournal6.com)



UDC 950/960

### **Asia-Pacific Regional Security After the Cold War: Confrontation or the Movement Towards Consent?**

Elena Yu. Litsareva

Tomsk State University, Russian Federation  
Prospect Lenina, 36, Tomsk, 634050  
Dr. (History), Professor  
E-mail: [elits2011@mail.ru](mailto:elits2011@mail.ru)

#### **Abstract**

The article examines the security issues in the Asia-Pacific region after the cold war. At that time Asia-Pacific region was the only world region with the domination of the economic regional ties and not actually increasing the influence of the military factor. The security issues in the Asia-Pacific region have been limited to the maintenance of stability, at both the national and regional levels. Security, freedom and prosperity in the region were directly dependent on the “postmodern” principles of negotiations, compromises and economic cooperation. Most regional countries were turned into the “postmodernist” states, invested significant economic potential not into the militarization, but into the welfare strengthening at national and regional levels. However, there were unresolved regional conflicts and destabilizing factors. A struggle for the political leadership was one of the tension sources. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the "postmodern" principles in the region have been shattered, because of the threat of nuclear proliferation became especially acutely in the whole of the East Asia, in both the South and the North. In the spring of 2013, the Asia-Pacific region was the center of a military confrontation, and developments at the Korean peninsula - an indication that the East Asia countries have yet to develop the effective system of the security in the region.

**Keywords:** Asia-Pacific region; regional security; cold war; Korean peninsula; military confrontation.

#### **Introduction**

The Asia-Pacific region has always attracted the close attention of the policy makers and the researchers. In the first half of the 1970's, it was connected with the events of a historical significance. There was a struggle in the region for the spheres of the influence by the great powers- the United States, Japan and the USSR. The first studies on the Asia-Pacific region “flourishing” began to appear in the 1970's. These studies separated the region of the Pacific Ocean, as some economic and political integrity, from the other regions of the world, especially from the Western Europe and said that the future belongs to the East Asia [1. P. 14-15]. A number of researchers, in particular, the American experts (for example the researches of the Stanford University, Institute of International Studies (University of California) and Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and

Peace) said that the centre of the world policy moves to the East, in particular to the Asia-Pacific region.

### Materials and Methods

The major sources for this article are the Asia-Pacific regional summit declarations, treaties and statements of various political leaders. Expert opinions, concerning these issues, were collected on open resources, namely on special websites and journal publications. Methods. The author of the article uses comparative-historical and problem-chronological methods.

### Discussion

The development of the Asia-Pacific regional concept of security can be divided into two key periods: the post-cold war era 1990s and the first decade of the 21 century.

**The post-cold war era 1990s.** Against the backdrop of depressed world economy and the slowdown of the international trade at the beginning of 1990s there were high growth rates (6 %) of the Asia-Pacific region countries and the demonstration of the most successful economic development models (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)[2. P.136]. In all, at that time the Asia-Pacific region was the only world region with the domination of economic regional ties and not actually increasing the influence of the military factor.

However, there were unresolved regional conflicts and destabilizing factors: the challenge of both North and South Korea's dialogue; the continuing confrontation between the Mainland China and Taiwan, (especially the position of the United States in this matter); the territorial unity of Indonesia and the East Timor; the situation in Cambodia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea; the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Except Singapore and Brunei, in almost all the South-East Asia countries, there were ethnic conflicts, extremism and terrorism problems, including the Islamic fundamentalism. In this respect, situations in the Philippines, Myanmar and Indonesia (after the President M. Suharto resignation in 1998) were not stable. Along with the terrorism and extremism in the East and South-East Asia there were the threats of a piracy, drug and human trafficking.

Some unresolved political and psychological conflicts in the region had historical roots. It was connected with the consequence of Japanese colonial period. China had continued to remind about the Japanese expansionism during the World War the second, and a lack of Japan remorse when Japanese atrocities during the war were understated. This caused a sharp reaction in Japan. However, some ultranationalist answers of young Japanese and Chinese were the most worrying [3. P. 60]. Sometimes all this led to the anger from China, the Republic of Korea and the countries of the South-East Asia, especially when the Japanese leadership was too clearly sought to strengthen its political activity in the region, not content with a merely economic influence.

After the end of the cold war, one of the tension sources in the East Asia had become a struggle for the political leadership. The fight was against the backdrop of rapid economic and military growth of China, strengthen its relations with ASEAN, and the China's greater role in the North Korean nuclear crisis. All this happened while reducing the weight of Russia in the 1990s, and the lack of a clear position of the United States regarding the determination of the Asia-Pacific region place in its foreign policy strategy. For the most countries in the region, especially for China, the United States position in the field of security was the main problem in the post-cold war era. First of all, it wasn't so sure that America, in fact, was the sole superpower of the world. At the same time, the formation of a multipolar world order, as felt in China, for example, was to counteract the United States military predominance. Moreover, it was obvious that the United States, in principle, had not enough financial or technical resources for supporting the predominance.

Commending the role of the Association of the South-East Asia Nations and especially the efforts of individual ASEAN members, China considered this organization as one of the potential poles of the future multipolar world order. ASEAN's desire to maintain the South-East Asia as a peaceful and neutral region, free from domination by any regional or extra regional powers, fully coincided with the interests of China.

The security issues in the Asia-Pacific region after the cold war have been limited to the maintenance of stability, at both the national and regional levels. First of all, the South-East Asia countries were concerned about the national security strategies, in which, an economic component

began to play a special role. Initially, when the ASEAN was founded (1976), regional cooperation was considered as a mechanism for the protection of member countries against those states which were outside the Association, if the threat came from them, or from the confrontation between them - the Soviet Union or the United States in the cold-war era, or Vietnam, the USSR and China at some other periods.

Some researchers, analyzing the reasons for foundation of the ASEAN, stressed that in the face of the growing threat of communism in the South-East Asia, accelerated Indochina transition to communism and the intention of the West to withdraw its military forces from the region, the South-East Asia countries decided to stimulate their economic development and promote regional security [4. P. 27-28, 5. P. 3-4].

For a long time the security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was associated with the ASEAN security strategy and strengthening of a peace and stability as well as prosperity. For that the ASEAN countries had formed a Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. The first meeting of the Forum on the regional security took place in Bangkok on July 25, 1994. 18 states participated in the work of Forum – the ASEAN foreign ministers, foreign ministers of the dialogue partners of the Association (United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and the EU) and the foreign ministers of the advice partners (Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos). The ability to "attract all large, medium and smaller powers outside the South-East Asia to ASEAN platform for regional cooperation and confidence-building in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region" was a very important aspect of the South-East Asia states activities [6]. Already at the first meeting of the states participants had made the Declaration that the development of security in one part of the Asia-Pacific region can affect the security of the region as a whole. This Forum sought to promote the political dialogue on security and cooperation matters. Having no real military and political structures to deal with the security issues, the ASEAN Regional Forum had focused its attention on discussing the aspects and measures of "preventive diplomacy"[7, 8. P. 338]. Russia supported the initiative of the ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum and considered the ARF not only as an essential mechanism for dialogue on stability building in the Asia-Pacific region, but also a tool for promoting the concept of a multipolar world.

The intention of the United States to reduce its direct military presence in the region made a significant impact on changing the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of the Soviet military threat. It was connected with a problem of the allies and military bases. This problem was not directly related to the United States "joint defense agreements" with South Korea (1953) and Taiwan (1954), which were an integral part of the United States and the Soviet Union military blocs and alliances system after the World War II. In addition to Taiwan and South Korea, the United States had similar agreements with Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, and the Soviet Union-with the People's Republic of China. The "Block policy" of the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region was not such successful as in other regions. Established blocks (ANZUS-Australia, New Zealand, the United States (1951) and SEATO-United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan (1954)) were not sustained, such as the NATO. They virtually ceased in 1970s. Charles Kupchan, the researcher of Georgetown University, associated this with a lack of any identity and cultural community of the United States with the Asia-Pacific countries, unlike the European region [9].

With the United States troops and assistance, the South Korea and Taiwan had become important strategic locations in the region. They were, in fact, the US military bases in the East Asia. The United States supplied weapons to Taiwan army and planned to turn the South Korea into a factor of global military-strategic importance. In addition, the United States and Japan provided economic assistance, loans and credits to Taiwan and South Korea (since the mid 1960s).

The Government of Japan was not interested in the US withdrawal from the region and leaving the union with America. The US-Japan Partnership and concluded in 1952 the "Covenant of security" between Japan and the United States, which allowed the United States to place in Japan air and sea forces, remained the focus of Japanese foreign policy and national security strategy. They took into account, first of all, China's desire to become a regional leader, surpassing Japan's position, instability in Russia and the Japanese security problems in North-East Asia and on the Korean peninsula [10. P. 21-22, 24].

The problem of American military bases directly concerned the countries of the South-East Asia. After the end of the cold war between the East and the West, the United States, which until then had kept control of the South-East Asia, were to withdraw its armed forces. This took place against the backdrop of increasing China's military presence in Asia. China had actively pursued a policy of "rich country, strong army", annually increasing defense spending.

The concern of the region countries was the fact that China had kept secret the real state of its armed forces. Judging by the apparent modernization of the navy and air force, in addition to official statistics on defense spending, China had not reported about the actual cost. China also demanded that the EU lifted imposed in 1989(after the events of Tiananmen) embargo on imports of weapons and technology.

The escalation of the situation came about when China started to build up its navy in connection with the liquidation of the American military bases at the Philippines. The South-East Asia countries and India saw it as an attempt by China to use vacuum, formed after the withdrawal of the American troops, and to become military leader in the region. The negotiations on conditions for maintaining the US military bases over the next three years began in April 1988 in Manila after coming to power President K. Aquino. First of all, the negotiations involved two objects –the Subic Bay and Clark Field. Existing formal differences, caused by the Philippines' desire to obtain from the United States increasing rents, had led, in the end, the Philippine Senate approved a bill, prohibiting the placing on the national territory and the transit of nuclear weapons, as well as through the national water ships with nuclear weapons aboard.

January 4, 1992 the United States and Singapore, which developed military cooperation with the United States in the framework of signed in November 1990 a memorandum on the relationship, had agreed to transfer the US naval command base at the Subic Bay in 1993 to the territory of Singapore. It was planned transfer to the territory of Singapore the services, responsible for logistic support ships of the United States seventh fleet too. But it was not meant a creation bases at Singapore similar the Subic Bay and Clark Field. America had planned to move to a new strategy, aimed at the creation of wide network of smaller bases in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the ships could be dispersed among the various, relatively small logistical support fleet objects, but not in one location. America had planned to create the same objects for its navy and air force in other countries in the South-East Asia, while Malaysia and Indonesia had opposed. The Indonesia as the largest country of the Association of the South-East Asia Nations supported the establishment of peace and neutrality zone in the South-East Asia and believed that the foreign bases should be withdrawn from the region. So it was not an easy task to justify the actions of Indonesia's Association partner -Singapore. Indonesia's leaders had come to a compromise solution: to consider that the United States and Singapore agreement applies to the bilateral relationship memorandum, which includes the use of military facilities in Singapore, but precludes the establishment of military bases. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore had offered ports and airfields for the service of American aircraft and ships [10. P. 21-22].

In general, the relations between the United States and the Association of the South-East Asia Nations in the 1990s were under the recession. This was connected with not quite the correct assessment of the strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region by William J. Clinton Administration. Traditional low value of ASEAN's assessment by W. Clinton Administration for eight years "has not changed and has been regarded [ASEAN] as a lack of interest in him"[11]. The United States believed that after the end of the cold war the need to support regional groups, which previously were considered as a counterweight to the other great powers, eliminated. So, the US removed the Association from its foreign policy priority, misjudging the ASEAN potential for the integration, both at the subregional and regional levels.

In accordance with the "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (base document of "the Clinton doctrine"), the United States had focused in the East Asia on the "constructive engagement" of China. It was due to the fact that the strengthening of China as a regional centre was regarded by W. Clinton Administration as the main threat to establish global hegemony of the United States [12]. The situation in the South-East Asia was seen as being based on the US-Chinese relations, the ASEAN - as a group of small countries, which depend on these great states and strategic balance between them. The foreign policy of the Association's position was seen as a passive and lacking unity. Based on this, US relations with the countries of the region had developed mainly at the bilateral level. Reducing the significance of the South-East Asia in the

hierarchy of the United States national interests had resulted in the reduction of the permanent American troop's presence on the South-East Asia countries territory [13].

Despite the position of the US, the most countries in the region preferred preservation of the United States leadership (i.e. status quo) in the Asia-Pacific region. The regional states, due to the rapid economic development in the context of the cold war end, when the United States expressed their intention to gradually reduce the American armed forces presence in the region, gained the financial capacity to strengthen their military positions. At the same time, they knew perfectly well, that under the circumstances significant proportions of the funding, previously running on internal development and "economy growth", have to spend on the military needs. This became inevitable on the background of the Mainland China's growing and frightening power and led to another problem - the countries of the region have been actively engaged in arms build-up and modernization of the weapons.

Taiwan increased its forces to ensure the right of control over the Taiwan Strait. Malaysia had bought the United States FA-18 fighter planes. New Delhi and Kuala Lumpur had agreed to maintenance of MiG-29, which was purchased by Malaysia, and training their crews. The South-East Asia countries had high hopes for India as a deterrent to China in these years. The countries of the South-East Asia had a special interest in the Russian latest weapons technology. In June 1994, Malaysia had entered into an agreement with Russia to purchase MiG-29 and partnership relations between Russia and Malaysia were established in the same year [10. P. 22-23].

Expressing the desire to keep the United States presence in the region, the states of the South-East Asia, at the same time, expressed the dissatisfaction with the ideas of "democratic peace", based on western (American) liberal values (the "Clinton doctrine"). Particularly, the ASEAN countries reacted negatively to the criticism by W. Clinton administration of the military Myanmar Government, because such behavior was contrary to the principles of the ASEAN. Myanmar has always played an important role for the South-East Asia. The successful solution to the Myanmar situation has affected the ASEAN cooperation with other regional groups and countries that invested in the South-East Asia (the Asia-Europe Meeting, for example). At that time there have been situations when further cooperation with these countries and regional associations were depending on ASEAN's ability to resolve regional conflicts, ensuring the security in the region. So, the issue of Myanmar was one of the key issues in this regard. Myanmar's gradual return to the political arena has increased its value to the regional context.

The need to limit interference in the regional affairs of the "great powers" had led to the election of the ASEAN leaders a special strategy to attract these powers in the multilateral regional arrangements. This helped to maintain the "great powers" interest in the stable development of the region and action within the framework of certain principles of a conduct, elaborated by the Association. These standards were to be found in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (1976) and the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone (Bangkok, 1995). The guiding principles of the strategy were: to prevent domination by any one country; to develop ASEAN rules of conduct; to avoid imposing any external rules. With the help of "passive resistance", ASEAN countries were able to avoid not only conflict with the world's leading powers, but forced them to take into account the interests and views of the Association in dealing with various issues, using multiple, but delicate waivers of non-regional players economic and political cooperation constructions.

The Association states were based on the "ASEAN method". The "non-interference in the internal affairs of one another" and consensus were fundamental principles of this method. The culture of the ASEAN political dialogue was to achieve consensus through long negotiating process. Leaders of the Association consistently emphasized the specificity of this organization. They said that due to historical, cultural and political reasons, the ASEAN always preferred informal understanding and voluntary agreements [14]. This "ASEAN method" justified itself with the development of the Association relation to the regime of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons non-proliferation, as well as the situation in the South China Sea. For a long time there was a dispute in this region over the Spratly archipelago and a number of other islands ownership. In June 1995 the balance of power in the region had changed in connection with the Vietnam's membership in ASEAN. The Association "came out" to the southern borders of the Mainland China and the ASEAN member states (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam), as well as Taiwan, began to confront China in the territorial dispute. In addition, China announced the sovereignty

over the entire area of the South China Sea. Thanks to the efforts of the ASEAN countries to involve China in bilateral and multilateral relationships the position of China on this issue was becoming more moderate. China has established official relations with ASEAN in 1991 and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996, signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (1976). Along with Japan, China has been of great assistance to the region in 1997, when the financial and economic crisis erupted. Since the late 1990s the ASEAN and China have been developing the mechanisms for strategic development of the East Asia, security issues and making the Asia-Pacific region in sustainable stability place. Japan and South Korea also joined this process and the "ASEAN plus three" format was created [2. P. 190].

Thus, during the period under review, on the basis of the main trends in the development of the East Asia region, in general, the structure of the regional balance of power could be expressed in the form of such system as "China-United States-Japan" with the center of the ASEAN. The appearance of this marked on the balance of the entire East Asia region. All the participants of this system were interested in its stability, which largely depended on the balance of the ASEAN relationship with other parties. Then Russia gradually joined this system. It was finding a balance in relations with all of the great powers, remained a key challenge of ASEAN security concept.

**The first decade of the 21 century.** The terror attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 have made significant changes in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. The global war against terror around the world and the United States doctrine of "preventive actions"(2002) have led to alertness of regional leaders. It was necessary to strike a balance between maintaining the loyalty of the population, often demonstrating the anti-American and Pan-Asian sentiments and the need to support the United States actions [15].

In many ways, the underestimation of the South-East Asia by W. Clinton Administration and the unilateral policy of J. Bush Administration led to raise anti-American sentiments in some ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia. For a long time the United States did not hide its negative attitude to the ASEAN Regional Forum, as the Forum was initiated by the ASEAN and acted on the programmer and in accordance with the principles of the Association, leaving no hope for a leadership to the United States in security matters in the region. During the Presidency of J. Bush the US Secretary of State C. Rice rarely attended the ARF meetings. The United States for a long time refused to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (1976), fearing the loss of the "free hand" in the region. America had not participated in the negotiations on the signing of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone Protocol. In addition, the United States traditionally have not supported the East Asia multilateralism and seek their own interests, mainly through the development of bilateral ties. They actively enhanced relations with the South-East Asia states, including with non-traditional allies of the United States (for example, Indonesia and Vietnam), using the conditions of the war against international terrorism. During this period, a number of agreements on military cooperation have been signed with Thailand and the Philippines, which were granted the status of strategic allies outside the NATO.

In April 2000, the United States and Singapore signed an agreement on the mutual security of supply and provision of technical services to the armed forces. The United States navy received the right to use the base of the air force-Paya Lebar and naval base - Changi for operations in the Malacca Strait, and then widely used to supply the United States and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The United States began to return their troops to the former base in Thailand and the Philippines. The anti-terrorist centre and two new navy bases were established in Thailand in 2003. The United States fully restored military ties with Indonesia in 2005. A new, unprecedented negotiation format of Vietnam and the United States dialogue on political-military affairs was established in October 2008. This format included regular mutual visits by the state heads and defense ministers of the two countries.

More significant changes in American policy toward the South-East Asia occurred with the advent of B. Obama Administration. The US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia and ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta in February 2009 during the first foreign visit. She signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (1976) in July 2009 at the regular session of the ARF. The United States back to the negotiating table on the signing of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone Protocol. At the same time, the South-East Asia countries have not focused on the US military build-up and strengthening of military alliances. It was

necessary to develop a programmer of cooperation that would solve the most acute problems of the region [16].

Moreover, if the United States showed interest in the military-political cooperation, security issues, China had focused attention on the economic and socio-cultural aspects of cooperation with the region countries. It concerned not only ASEAN, but also the East Asia as a whole. In the first decade of the 21st century the United States policy in the region and in particular in the North-East Asia was largely determined by competition with China [9]. The United States were very concerned that with the development of the East Asian regionalism and the strengthening of the China, Mainland China could replace the United States in terms of the influence in the region, thus reducing the role of the US. In fact, the problem to take a seat of the United States in the East Asia had not been a priority for China. The Mainland China had to solve various internal problems of the country and improve the well-being of the Chinese people. In addition, the Chinese leadership understood that the United States played a key role in the regional security, and China itself had no real potential to reduce the influence of the United States in the region, which was determined by not only a military presence in the region, but also the state of the US economy [17. P. 58-59].

At the same time, economically powerful China has become one of the strongest military powers. An expert on China, Doctor Pierre Picquart from the University of Paris-VIII notes that Chinese army receives a new technology and fighters such as F14, and the Chinese army is the largest army in the world with personnel in 1250000. In addition, the military budget of China must be 238 billion dollars in 2015. The Director of the Institute for international and strategic studies, Jean-Vincent Brisset stresses that the military program adopted in the country till 2030, bases not only on the protection of the China's sovereignty, but also on the formation of a powerful fleet, which can be able to conduct operations far from China's shores. Assumes that China should be able to prevent the presence of any foreign forces in Chinese waters (which, according to the Chinese leadership, extending to the center of the Pacific). In this regard, the American aircraft carriers are the main enemy of the Beijing [18].

China, faced with the "policy of restraint" on the part of the United States and the continued vigilance of the countries of the region to its might, had to operate "soft influence" in the Asia-Pacific region [19]. China has been included in the work of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks, used the mechanism of "economic diplomacy", providing investment in the countries of the Indochina, recently acceded to the ASEAN, developed military cooperation with the US traditional allies - the Philippines and Thailand. China was the first country outside the ASEAN, which acquired the status of a "strategic partner" of the Association. This led to the new rise of the China- South-East Asia relations [20]. At the 7th ASEAN Summit (October 8, 2003) China and member countries of the Association signed a Declaration on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity, which was defined as non-military, open and not denying the right to develop comprehensive ties of friendship and cooperation with the other countries [21].

The countries of the region were positive that China supported cooperation on a peace and security in the region, but not engaged the South-East Asia states in any military alliances. China did not impose sanctions on Myanmar authoritarian regimes in contrast to the United States and the EU. At the same time, there were differences in China and ACEAH approaches to regional issues. ASEAN leaders supported the Chinese colleagues that there was a need for a new world order to replace the post bipolar world. But the Beijing has maintained that the new world order should be based on the principle of "multi-polarity". The ASEAN countries have advocated the principle of multilateralism, which assumed equality between the States with collective participation in addressing problems without any "poles" and "big brother" in the face of China or any other State.

In this regard, the States of the South-East Asia were more impressed "the doctrine of Koizumi" (formulated by Japan in 2002). The essence of this doctrine was to enhance cooperation with the ASEAN countries in economy and security matters on the basis of equality and respect [22]. Despite domestic difficulties, associated with the effects of economic and political crises of the 1990s, Japan carefully watched a changing strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region and the rise of China. By all means Japan tried to gain a foothold in the East Asia. In addition, the United States insisted that Japan should play a more active political role, not only in the region but also beyond it. Japanese leaders regarded an economically strong and politically stable South-East Asia as a counterweight to China and real opportunity to retain their positions [23. P. 157]. In addition,

Japan has always actively supported the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, as well as contributed to the formation of the Council for the Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region - the largest non-governmental organization set up to support the ARF.

The vital Russia's political and economic interests, along with the modernization of the Eastern Siberia and the Far East, caused the need to ensure own security in the Asia-Pacific region. Developing key provisions of Russia's foreign policy concept and Eurasian mission, it was necessary to have taken into account, that in conditions of market development and existing of a multipolar world, Russia should pursue an active policy, at both the Asian and European destinations. In practice, the Asian direction of the Russian foreign policy has significantly lagged behind the needs and strategic interests of the Russia. The reasons for this underdevelopment lay in the 1990s, when there was a large-scale size reduction of the Russian armed forces in the Far East, leading to the passivity of the Russian presence in the region. This greatly reduced the ability of Russia to act as a deterrent against the United States, defending its leadership, and China. The situation in the Asia-Pacific region was uncertain, but there were not any East Asian countries fears about the Russia's ambitions in the region and a threat to peace and stability with its hand. This approach to Russia meant a profound transformation after the cold war.

At the new conditions the Russia Federation supported the countries of the East Asia in ensuring security and stability in the region. This primarily concerned the efforts of the ASEAN to establish a South-East Asia nuclear weapon free zone. It was, as thought the Russian leadership, a real contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and global security. In 2003, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the ASEAN signed a joint Declaration on partnership for peace and security, prosperity and development in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2004 Russia had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia (1976) [24]. During the first Summit (Kuala Lumpur, December 13, 2005) Russia and ASEAN adopted a Declaration on the development of a comprehensive partnership. The goals were to achieve economic growth, sustainable development, prosperity and social progress of the ASEAN countries and the Russian Federation on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit and shared responsibility and to promote peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region [25].

By the beginning of the 21st century the threat of nuclear proliferation became especially acutely in the whole of the East Asia, in both the South and the North. The Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone in the South-East Asia, based on the Bangkok Treaty (1995), has played a key role for the region. Working closely with the traditional international mechanisms of a non-proliferation, the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone was established to be of exceptional regional Institute for the non-proliferation regime in the South-East Asia [26]. This unique mechanism combines in a single security space very disparate regional countries. In accordance with the concept of the ASEAN development, the Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone was a step towards the establishment of a Zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the region. The implementation of this project became a new stage in the foreign policy thinking of the South-East Asia countries. However, the States parties failed to significantly advance as to the process of negotiations with the nuclear-weapon countries to sign the special Protocol of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone. According to the Protocol, the nuclear-weapon States undertook a number of commitments: not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to member countries of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone; should declare their intention to contribute to the achievement of general and complete disarmament of the nuclear weapons. The reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone was a major limiting factor, reduces the effectiveness of a Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone, and the entire non-proliferation regime of the nuclear weapons in the region. One of the most logical solutions to this problem is the signing of this Protocol individually by each country of the "nuclear five" with reservations, actual, desired and arranged by all parties concerned.

Another item of concern to the world community on the non-proliferation regime became Myanmar. Since 2000, Myanmar repeatedly was suspected in an attempt to gain access to the nuclear weapons technology. In this regard, the intensive development of contacts between Myanmar and North Korea (the wrongdoing state of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons) in the military sphere was the main threat.

Along with the attention that the countries of the South-East Asia have given nuclear non-proliferation regime and the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone in the region, a special place in the politics of the ASEAN states have held the national programmers for the development of the nuclear energy as an one of the foundations of nuclear safety. Over the last decade, the South-East Asia has become the region demonstrated a high degree of interest in the power of the atom. The intention of the South-East Asia countries to develop a nuclear power caused concern of the international community. Such development was to take place in the countries, that were a new on nuclear market, and it could carry a certain risk. In these countries there were not the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks and a sufficient number of professional staff, and there was a high level of terrorist threat. According to the international expert community, in general, the South-East Asia countries, with the exception of Myanmar, did not pose a threat for the international non-proliferation regime and had not significant risks. In most cases, the governments of the South-East Asia states have always attached great importance to the traditional non-proliferation international mechanisms, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons, as well as an export control mechanisms.

The greatest threat to security in the Asia-Pacific region at the first decade of the 21st century represented the situation in North-East Asia. This was due to the developments on the Korean peninsula and the issue of the North Korea. North Korea's nuclear tests showed the inefficiency of the existing political and military means to counter the spread of the nuclear weapons. In 2006 the Pyongyang held the first underground explosion of a nuclear device. In 2007 in the course of the six-party talks (the North Korea (DPRK), Republic of Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States), an agreement on a phased implementation of the denuclearization by the North Korea was reached. At the same time, the Yongbyon reactors were stopped.

The North Korean nuclear program was an "experimental platform" for the coordination of the parties involved in the field of Asia-Pacific region security. In addition, the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear problem could be a step towards the establishment of a multilateral system of security in the region. With a new security challenges and threats China, South Korea and Russia have promoted the idea of keeping this format after the settlement of the crisis in the North Korea. But the North Korea has considered nuclear programmer not as a tool of war deterrence, but rather as a means of obtaining financial assistance from the United States and security guarantees. Some experts have argued that for many years the United States closed their eyes on the North Korea, helped her to create the atomic industry and even allowed (unlike Iraq) to get hold of nuclear weapons. In their view, the Pyongyang was "a useful enemy" and the pretext for the American military presence in the South of China. The purpose of such "Asian belt" was not only to counter the North Korean threat (real risk, but at the same time a pretext for maintaining American bases), but also "surrounding of China" (the present geo-strategic enemy of the United States), which together with Russia was a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization - an Alliance of former Soviet republics and China against American hegemony [27].

Over the past decades, the North Korea many times promised to inflict a crushing blow on the "United States puppets" in the South of the peninsula, declared martial law, the mobilization of the army and the large-scale exercises. As a rule, the North Korea alternated periods of provocation with periods of tension-reducing, when the DPRK, under pressure of China agreed to return to the negotiating table renouncing nuclear weapons on the peninsula. For years the Beijing has provided an economic assistance to the North Korea and diplomatic protection from the United States and other States. Gradually, the North Korea became a very restless ally for China, which increasingly put him in an uncomfortable situation. The DPRK was not subordinated to any dictates, even from China. China found itself in a difficult situation. On the one hand, China wanted to stand in one number with other Nations, on the other hand, could not throw its ally. There have been two military incident in 2010 - the South Korean Corvette "Cheonan" sinking by the North Korean submarine and the shelling of the island Œnphënd. Because of the new leadership of Kim Jong Un, the North Korean regime tone tightened in February 2013. It was important for Kim Jong Un to strengthen position and power, as all regional leaders were a new: the new Government in China, the new President of South Korea, the new Prime Minister in Japan [28].

Nuclear test in February 2013 led to the strengthening of the UN sanctions and threats of retaliation from the Pyongyang. The international community should look at the North Korean more seriously [29]. The North Korean threat to use nuclear weapons to the United States, the

consolidation of nuclear status in the State Constitution and resumption of the plutonium producing reactor in the Yongbyon had irreversible consequences not only for the Asia but also for the whole world. At the same time, it was not clear whether the North Korean is a full-fledged nuclear power ready to use the nuclear weapons.

The expert of the International Institute for strategic studies Mark Fitzpatrick speculated that probably North Korea has purchased the technology for weapons manufacturing (based on enriched uranium) from the same Pakistan suppliers that sold nuclear technology to Libya and Iran [30]. It is also known that the North Korean missile programmer developed in collaboration with Iranian and Pakistan programmers, and some tests could take place on the territory of these countries.

The North Korea threats of nuclear attack on the United States and the Republic of Korea in the spring of 2013 have led to the intention to strengthen the United States missile defense in Alaska by 2017 through 14 interceptors [28]. The United States did not believe in the early disappearance of the attack threat from the North Korea and had intended to place the ground-based interception complex for high-rise of medium-range missiles on Guam [31]. The North Korean nuclear threat to the United States and the South Korea automatically launched the mechanism of preventive action, including the buildup of American military power in the region and the concentration of the intelligence assets on the Korean peninsula that was not so far from the Northeast China and the Russian Far East.

Thus, in conclusion, in the spring of 2013, the Asia-Pacific region has become the center of a military confrontation, and developments on the Korean peninsula - an indication that the Asia-Pacific countries have yet to develop the effective system of the security in the region. And it will be very difficult to do. So the "postmodern" principles in the region have been shattered.

#### References:

1. Arin O. Asia-Pacific region: myths, illusions and reality. Moscow, 1997.435p.
2. Litsareva E. Economic integration on the European continent and at the Asia-Pacific region in the second half of the 20th century. Tomsk: Tomsk University Publishing House, 2004. 222p.
3. Soogil Y. Prospects for East Asia Community [Electronic resource] // The Trilateral Commission, pp. 60-64. URL: [http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual\\_meeting/eastasia\\_prospects.pdf](http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual_meeting/eastasia_prospects.pdf) (accessed 4. 01. 2014)
4. Ravenhill J. APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000. 294 p.
5. Tongzon J. The economies of Southeast Asia. Before and after the crisis. Second edition. Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 2002. 308 p.
6. Jawhar H. Trust-Building in Southeast Asia: What Made it Possible? [Electronic resource]//Global Asia. A JOURNAL OF THE EAST ASIA FOUNDATION. 2013. Vol.8. N.3. fall. URL: <http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/454/Trust-Building-in-Southeast-Asia:-What-Made-it-Possible?-.html> (accessed 15. 12. 2013)
7. Severino R. A New Culture of Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific. Statement by, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at the inaugural session of the Fourth Consultative Meeting among Executive Heads of Sub-regional Organizations and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Katmandu. 1998. October. 26.
8. Severino R. ASEAN as a partner for Europe// ASEAN Economic Bulletin. Singapore. 2001.Vol. 18. N 3(Dec.). pp. 337-341.
9. Kupchan Ch. From Enmity to Amity: Trust's Part in US Foreign Policy[Electronic resource]// Global Asia. A JOURNAL OF THE EAST ASIA FOUNDATION. 2013. Vol.8. N. 3. fall. URL: [http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/458/From-Enmity-to-Amity:-Trust% Do% B1 % Do%BFs-Part-in-US-Foreign-Policy-.html](http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/458/From-Enmity-to-Amity:-Trust%20Do%20BFs-Part-in-US-Foreign-Policy-.html) (accessed 14. 12. 2013).
10. Litsareva E. Contemporary History of Asia and Africa countries. 1945-2000. Tomsk: Tomsk University Publishing House, 2001. 102 p.
11. Rizal S. US-Southeast Asia Relations after the Crisis. The Security Dimension/Background Paper Prepared for The Asia Foundation's Workshop on America's Role in Asia. Bangkok. 2000.

- March 22-24 [Electronic resource]//The Asia Foundation. URL: [http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/ussearelations\\_aria.pdf](http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/ussearelations_aria.pdf) (accessed 8. 07. 2006).
12. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House. 1995. February [Electronic resource]//The Air University. URL: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf> (accessed 11. 05. 2012).
13. Joshua P. The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and The South China Sea Dispute [Electronic resource]//Asian Survey. 2005. Vol. XLV. N. 3. May/June. URL: <http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/Rowan,%20US-Japan,%20ASEAN,%20%26%20CS%20Dispute,%20Asian%20Survey.pdf> (accessed 10. 05. 2012)
14. Severino R. Will ASEAN Be Like the EU? Remarks by Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at the European Policy Center. Brussels. 2001. March 23
15. Parameswaran P. ASEAN leaders to weigh counterterrorism agenda/Agence France-Presse. 2002. November 1 [Electronic resource]//ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/twt/twt1.htm> (accessed 15. 06. 2006)
16. Rizal S. US Policy Towards Southeast Asia: a New Paradigm? / Presented at the 24<sup>th</sup> Asia-Pacific Roundtable. Kuala Lumpur. 2010. June 7-9. [Electronic resource] //ISIS. URL: [http://www.isis.org.my/files/24APRWEB/Rizal\\_Sukma.pdf](http://www.isis.org.my/files/24APRWEB/Rizal_Sukma.pdf) (accessed 16.09.2013)
17. Yaqing Q. Prospects for East Asia Community [Electronic resource]//The Trilateral Commission, pp. 54-60. URL: [http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual\\_meeting/eastasia\\_prospects.pdf](http://www.trilateral.org/download/file/annual_meeting/eastasia_prospects.pdf) (accessed 04. 01. 2014)
18. Chine est-elle en train de préparer la prise de contrôle de la planète? [Electronic resource]//Atlántico. 2013. 4 mai. URL: <http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/chine-est-elle-en-train-preparer-prise-controle-planete-jean-vincent-brisset-pierre-picquart-659208.html?page=0,0> (accessed 15.09. 2013)
19. McDevitt M. America's New Security Strategy and Its Military Dimension [Electronic resource]//Global Asia. A JOURNAL OF THE EAST ASIA FOUNDATION. 2012. Vol.7. N.4. winter. URL: <http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/61/americas-new-security-strategy-and-its-military-dimension.html> (accessed 16.09.2013)
20. Palanca E.H. China's Economic Growth: Implications to the ASEAN [Electronic resource]//Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Policy notes. 2002. No. 2002-04. May. URL: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan005055.pdf> (accessed 25.06. 2006)
21. Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. Bali. 2003. October 8 [Electronic resource]//ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm> (accessed 25.06. 2006)
22. Tang S. Japan's Grand Strategic Shift from Yoshida to Koizumi: Reflections on Japan's Strategic Focus in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century [Electronic resource]//Akademika 70. 2007. January. URL: [http://www.ukm.my/penerbit/akademika/ACROBATAKADEMIKA70/akademika70\[07\].pdf](http://www.ukm.my/penerbit/akademika/ACROBATAKADEMIKA70/akademika70[07].pdf) (accessed 05. 01. 2014)
23. Nishihara M. Japan's Political and Security Relations with ASEAN/ASEAN-Japan Cooperation: A Foundation for East Asian Community [Electronic resource]//Japan Center for International Exchange, pp. 154-167. URL: [http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/ASEAN/asean\\_nishihara.pdf](http://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/ASEAN/asean_nishihara.pdf) (accessed 05. 01. 2014)
24. Russia's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (the Bali Treaty). 1976 [Electronic resource] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://www.mid.ru/bdcomp/ns-rasia.nsf/3a0108443c964002432569e7004199c0/432569d80021985fc3256ee00036b0c8!OpenDocument> (accessed 25.06. 2006)
25. Chairman's Statement of the First ASEAN-Russian Federation Summit. Kuala Lumpur. 2005. December 13[Electronic resource] Association of Southeast Asian Nations. URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/18085.htm> (accessed 25.06. 2006)
26. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Bangkok. 1995. December 15. [Electronic resource] Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Basic Documents. URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/2082.htm> (accessed 25.06. 2006)

27. Del Valle A. Menace nord-coréenne : qui de Pyongyang ou des Etats-Unis joue le plus un double jeu? [Electronic resource] // Atlántico. 2013. avril 8. URL: [www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/menace-nord-coreenne-qui-pyongyang-ou-etats-unis-joue-plus-double-jeu-alexandre-del-valle-691247.html](http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/menace-nord-coreenne-qui-pyongyang-ou-etats-unis-joue-plus-double-jeu-alexandre-del-valle-691247.html) (accessed 15.09. 2013)
28. North Korea in nuclear hysterics [Electronic resource]//Euronews. 2013. March 27. URL: [www.euronews.com/2013/03/27/north-korea-in-nuclear-hysterics](http://www.euronews.com/2013/03/27/north-korea-in-nuclear-hysterics) (accessed 15.09. 2013)
29. Mansourov A. The Rubik's Cube of North Korea Can Be Solved with Creative Thinking [Electronic resource]//Global Asia. A JOURNAL OF THE EAST ASIA FOUNDATION. 2013. Vol.8, N 3. fall. URL: [www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/456/The-Rubik%Do%B1%Do%BFs-Cube-of-North-Korea-Can-Be-Solved-With-Creative-Thinking.html](http://www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/456/The-Rubik%Do%B1%Do%BFs-Cube-of-North-Korea-Can-Be-Solved-With-Creative-Thinking.html) (accessed 14. 12. 2013).
30. Fitzpatrick M. Yongbyon restart: North Korea ramps up nuclear tension [Electronic resource]//BBC. 2013. April 2. URL: [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22006636](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22006636) (accessed 14. 12. 2013)
31. Baker R. 2013. China and North Korea: A Tangled Partnership [Electronic resource]//Stratfor Global Intelligence. 2013. April 16. URL: [www.stratfor.com/weekly/china-and-north-korea-tangled-partnership?utm\\_source=freelist-f&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=20130416&utm\\_term=gweekly&utm\\_content=readmore&elq=deacc2678920423f97865ec75c2a90](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china-and-north-korea-tangled-partnership?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20130416&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=deacc2678920423f97865ec75c2a90) (accessed 14. 12. 2013)